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ABSTRACT 
Recent studies have shown that deep convolutional neural 
networks (DCNN) are vulnerable to adversarial examples 
and sensitive to perceptual quality as well as the acquisition 
condition of images. These findings raise a big concern for 
the adoption of DCNN-based applications for critical tasks. 
In the literature, various defense strategies have been 
introduced to increase the robustness of DCNN, including 
re-training an entire model with benign noise injection, 
adversarial examples, or adding extra layers. In this paper, 
we investigate the connection between adversarial 
manipulation and image quality, subsequently propose a 
protective mechanism that doesn’t require re-training a 
DCNN. Our method combines image quality assessment 
with knowledge distillation to detect input images that 
would trigger a DCCN to produce egregiously wrong 
results. Using the ResNet model trained on ImageNet as an 
example, we demonstrate that the detector can effectively 
identify poor quality and adversarial images.   
Index Terms — robust classification, image quality 
assessment, convolutional neural network, adversarial 
examples
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the groundbreaking leap of deep convolution 
neural network in object classification tasks [1], numerous 
advances have been made in the network architecture 
[3,4,5], training and transfer learning techniques [6,7]. 
Many researchers are motivated to apply DCNN to tackle 
various visual pattern recognition problems. For example, 
object detection and localization [8], image and video 
caption [9], facial recognition [10], and more. With these 
researches, DCNN-based applications have flourished in 
recent years and in many areas including medical imaging 
diagnosis [11], autonomous driving [12], super resolution 
image [13], aesthetic quality assessment [14] as well as 
many other industries and consumer sectors. 
DCNN’s near human-level performance in terms of 
accuracy naturally raises questions such as why it performs 
so well; what is precisely learned inside each neural layer; 
and is it as robust as the human vision when quality 
degradation is present in the images.
Image quality assessment (IQA) [15] as a research topic
Fig. 1. Images with an alert icon are identified as not fit by our detector. 
Images with a green tick are labeled as fit by our detector. Original images 
of the top and bottom rows are from the validation set of ImageNet [2].
Images in the second row are adversarials perturbed with the universal 
perturbation map [21] and classified by ResNet-152 in left to right order as 
goldfish, vending machine, sock, and bow tie. Images in the third row are 
examples from [20] and classified by ResNet-152 in left to right order as 
honeycomb, traffic light, accordion and water snake. The bottom row 
includes images injected with blur or Gaussian noise at different distortion 
levels and classified by ResNet-152 in left to right order as whiskey jug, 
beacon (true label), tree frog and zebra.
has existed since the beginning of the image processing 
discipline. The types and magnitude of image quality 
distortion, as well as their impacts on the visual quality 
perceived by the human visual system have been 
extensively studied. Numerous IQA algorithms have been 
developed and have found their ways in many image 
processing and multimedia applications such as denoising 
and super-resolution. In very recent years, studies emerge 
around the impact of image quality on DCNN performance. 
DCNN trained on the ImageNet suffer non-trivial 
performance degradation [16] when images are distorted 
with high degree of blur or noise. Significant performance 
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recognition model [17] trained on popular face datasets. [18] 
reports that Google's Cloud Vision API is also vulnerable 
when fed with noisy images. 
The investigation on DCNN reveals its vulnerabilities as 
well as discovers many methods that can generate 
adversarial examples to elicit utterly wrong results from 
DCNN. [19] is the first in the literature to demonstrate that 
when given a clean image, iteratively exploiting computed 
gradient and perturbing pixel values in a range that is 
indistinguishable to the human eye, we can fool DCNN to 
misclassify a school bus as an ostrich. Using evolutionary 
algorithms, [20] shows that DCNN can be easily fooled into 
making highly confident predictions on images that are 
unrecognizable to human eyes. Very recently, [21] proposes 
a method that produces a single perturbation map from a 
trained DCNN model, dubbing the universal perturbation 
map. By using several popular DCNN networks, the team 
demonstrates that DCNN is vulnerable to fooling images 
perturbed with these maps. According to [22], this universal 
perturbation method is one of the most potent adversarial 
methods so far in the literature. 
Others look into the physical world for potential threats 
to DCNN-based applications. [23] finds that the ImageNet 
Inception classifier [24] misclassifies a significant 
percentage of images obtained from cell-phone cameras. 
Toxic road signs created by taking a black-box approach to 
distort road signs with lenticular printing and background 
injection techniques [25] have also been found to deceive 
auto-driving cars successfully. By using a forensic task, 
camera model identification, [26] shows that DCNN is 
exceptionally vulnerable to adversarial examples generated 
with Fast Gradient Sign (FGSM) and projected gradient 
descent (PGD) methods.
Disregarding the generation methods, we observe that a 
significant percentage of malicious alternations in the 
adversarial images in the literature are perceivable to the 
human eyes if seen under a viewing condition that is 
adopted in the IQA research field to collect subjective 
quality scores from human observers. Most of these 
alternations bear some resemblance to signal distortions in 
the color image dataset [27] used to assess and compare 
visual quality metrics and algorithms. An extreme example 
is the unrecognizable fooling images produced using the 
gradient ascent method (see the bottom row in Appendix C). 
The visual qualities of these images are not fit for carrying 
out any object detection task. 
Our study shows that the classification performance of 
DCNN drops when the quality of input images degraded. 
Image quality is often ignored in visual recognition 
challenges such as PASCAL VOC [28] and ILSVRC [2], 
where most if not all images used for model training and 
validation are recognizable or around average quality. 
However, in reality, vision applications could receive 
images far below average quality. For example, auto-driving 
in an extremely hazy day or image acquisition lens is 
dirtied. Such scenarios pose practical challenges to the 
design of robust vision applications. 
By gauging adversarial and poor-quality images with a 
visual quality metric, we propose a method to detect images 
that are not fit for carrying out an object classification task. 
One of the uniqueness of the proposed method is that it is 
non-intrusive per the object classification system. We do not 
alter the structure of the DCNN and its trained weights. 
Instead, we conjugate its output (a prediction vector) with 
an image quality score to train an auxiliary network. This 
network is capable of detecting input images that are not fit 
for the object classification task, i.e., the object 
classification system would produce a wrong result with a 
high probability if not stopped.
In this paper, related works are reviewed first, followed 
by a correlation study between the performance of DCNN 
and image quality and adversarial examples. The proposed 
detection methods are explained in section IV, followed by 
experiments and analyses in section V. Finally, conclusion 
and future work are discussed in section VI.   
II. RELATED WORKS
On protecting CNN against adversarial attacks, distinct 
approaches have been explored and demonstrated by many 
researchers. One direction is modifying the images by 
injecting small noise and minor adversarial perturbation into 
clean data and then training or re-training a DCNN with both 
original and processed data. It is also shown that training 
with compressed images mitigates the adversarial impact to 
some degree. Another direction is modifying the CNN 
structure by adding an extra layer to smooth out small 
adversarial noise or devising a regularization strategy to 
increase the stability of neuron activations. This line of 
approach has been shown effective on smaller networks 
trained with MNIST and CIFAR datasets but 
computationally hard to re-train very large networks that 
were trained on the entire ImageNet data.  A third direction 
is attaching an auxiliary network to the intermediate layers or 
output layer of a DCNN and using these layers' output as 
features to learn a detector that discriminates adversarial 
images from clean images. Our work is closer to the third 
direction in that the proposed method also utilizes auxiliary 
networks. Related works in this direction are discussed 
below.
 Quantizing the output from the late-stage ReLU layers of 
VGG-19 and ResNet-32 into discrete input features, [22] 
trains an RBF-SVM as an adversary detector and reports 
performance on four types of adversarial attacks including 
the DeepFool [29]. It shows that adversarial manipulations in 
the depth map of RGBD images can be detected as well.  
Collecting convolutional layers' output from VGG-16 
and AlexNet and then processing them with PCA analysis, 
[30] extracts the statistics from normalized PCA coefficients 
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form a cascade SVM. The SVM is trained with 2000 L-
BFGS adversarial images generated from the original images 
of the ImageNet validation set and a subset of the original 
images. The adversarial detection performance is tested with 
2000 L- BFGS adversarial images. The model generalization 
capability is tested using the fooling images in [20]. 
Without requiring adversarial images, [31] uses 
autoencoder to learn the manifold of clean images. Their 
detector will reject a test image if its reconstruction error is 
significant or the probability divergence between the target 
classifier and the encoded representation is big. The authors 
conclude the detector performs well over MNIST and 
CIFAR-10 images perturbed by DeepFool.
[32] proposes to extend a smaller subnetwork from 
ResNet-32 as an adversary detector. The detector itself is a 
CNN and trained with adversarial images in various degrees 
of perturbations. Using images from the CIFAR-10 and 
relevant ten object classes from the ImageNet, the authors 
conclude the detector has strong discriminative power over 
tiny perturbations even almost invisible to humans. 
 [33] proposes a detection framework by measuring the 
difference between object classification result of a given 
image and that of its reduced images using reducing color 
bits and smoothing processing. The detection performance of 
eleven attacks over six types of adversarial methods is 
reported over MNIST, CIFAR-10, and a small portion of 
images from the ImageNet validation set. 
[34] proposes a detection strategy that compares the 
difference between classification results of a given image 
and that of its reduced images is exploited as well. The 
reduced images are produced using scalar quantization and 
smoothing processing. Performance is reported on the 
MNIST and three object classes from the ImageNet only. 
On the impact of image quality to the performance of 
CNN, [16] investigates the performance degradation on 
object classification task over two types of distortion 
Gaussian blur and additive Gaussian noise. In [17], the face 
recognition task is used to study the decrease in performance 
over six kinds of distortion. [18] finds Google's Could Vision 
API produces different classification given the same image 
but injected with noises of various degrees and conclude 
denoising the image before feeding it to the API mitigates 
the problem. 
To our best knowledge, there is no work in the literature 
connecting the image quality factor to the adversarial attack 
and propose a holistic solution that tackles both at the same 
time. The main contributions include:
• From an image quality assessment perspective and 
using semantic distance, we thoroughly study the 
impacts of four common types of distortion injection 
and three types of adversarial manipulation to object 
classification outcomes. We consider the semantic 
distance is a better metric in the classification context 
because the information on how wrong the result 
produced is encoded. Give an example; in Wu-Palmer 
[35] measure catamaran as 0.92 similar to trimaran and 
.052 similar to drilling platform. 
• Experimentally, we show the signal characteristic 
shared between distortion injections and adversarial 
perturbations and propose the image quality as a useful 
feature component for adversarial detection. 
• Using a no-reference IQA model, state-of-art object 
classification CNN trained on the ImageNet, and 
experimental data that covers 1000 object classes from 
the ImageNet, we demonstrate that the proposed 
method can effectively detect poor quality images and 
protect the object classification CNN from the 
adversarial attacks tested in a meaningful percentage as 
well.  
III. IMAGE QUALITY AND CLASSIFICATION 
PERFORMANCE 
Studies on image quality and adversarial attacks have a 
different motivation. In IQA, image pixels are altered by 
software to simulate perceptual quality degradation per 
human eyes. In adversarial attacks, image pixels are altered 
algorithmically to trigger DCNN into produce wrong 
outputs by human standards. Although the methods are 
different as well, pixel values are altered in both fields. 
Basing on this fundamental, we theorize that IQA methods 
could be leveraged into the design of adversarial defense 
methods. In this section, we describe the investigation 
methodology and present the experimental findings that 
support our theory.
A Methodology
Traditionally, image quality is systematically studied in 
types and magnitudes of distortion [27, 36, 37]. Various 
imaging processing techniques are applied to pristine 
images to produce distortions. In a laboratory or semi-
controlled environment, the distorted images are presented 
to human observers to evaluate the visual quality, with or 
without the pristine image aside. The quality scores 
collected from human observers are consolidated into a 
subjective mean opinion score (MOS) for each distorted 
image. 
The image quality assessment researches computational 
models that estimate the quality of an image that is 
perceived by the human visual system. Based on whether 
the reference image of a distorted image is available or not, 
an IQA model is either of full-reference, reduced-reference, 
or no-reference. To the problem in hand, no-reference IQA 
is a suitable tool. Most learning-based no-reference IQA 
models start with a quality-aware feature extractor that is 
designed manually. Subsequently, the extracted features are 
fed to a support vector machine to train a quality prediction 
model. For example, in [38], the quality aware features are 
general Gaussian distribution (GGD) statistics fitted from 
the coefficients of a discrete cosine transform from pixel 
intensity in the spatial domain. In [39], the underlying 
signals are histograms of pixel intensity, and then they are
4Fig. 2. A schematic diagram of the proposed detector
compressed into a learnable feature using GGD statistics. 
[40] designs a 14-layers CNN-based no-reference IQA 
model to extract features from 32x32 patches and learn a 
quality regressor. Arguing that not every region in an image 
has an equal impact on the overall image quality, a patch-
based weight map is also learned to pool the quality 
predictions into one score. [41] designs a 6-layers CNN-
based no-reference IQA model to learn a regressor. [42] 
proposes a 4-layers CNN architecture. In this study, we use 
a CNN-based no-reference IQA model DTNIQ-f from [43] 
to obtain the visual quality scores of distorted and 
adversarial images.
The DTNIQ-f design abandons the manual feature 
extraction step, instead uses the convolutional layers of 
popular CNN object classification models [1,3,5] trained on 
the ImageNet as a generic image feature extractor and trains 
a quality predictor with datasets from the IQA domain. As 
shown in Fig. 2 the DTNIQ-f IQA model contains two fully 
connected layers of 2048 neural nodes and an output layer of 
70 nodes. The activations from the fully connected layers are 
filtered by Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs). [6] and 
subsequent researches show that compared to the traditional 
tanh and sigmoid activation units ReLUs converges faster 
and leads to a better solution. Predicted MOS score is 
computed from the prediction layer using softmax. Let v  be 
the classification score and p  the number of patches 
cropped from one image during testing, the predicted MOS 
is calculated using q = 1
p
j ∗vj
j=1
70
∑
i=1
p
∑ . 
For investigation, we collect 4966 distorted or pristine 
images from the traditional image quality research literature, 
5000 unrecognizable fooling images from [20]; and using 
color images only from the ImageNet validation set and the 
universal perturbation [21] method produces 49,056 
recognizable adversarial images, and using the gradient 
ascent method produces 3000 unrecognizable adversarial 
images.
Firstly, the object recognition results of 4966 images 
from IQA datasets [27, 36, 37] are produced using DCNN 
models trained on the ImageNet. The semantic distances of 
results between distorted and reference images are 
calculated in Wu-Palmar term [35]. Using semantic 
similarly, we measure the impact of image quality to 
DCNN. From Table 1, we see AlexNet, VGG-16 and 
ResNet-152 are all affected. To CSIQ dataset, the mean 
similarity drops to 0.799. See appendix A for imagery 
examples about semantic similarity measured in the Wu-
Palmar term. Nevertheless, the performance degradation of 
the three DCCN models is on par. Considering ResNet-152 
is more widely used in the recent literature, we use ResNet-
152 only for the subsequent analyses and experiments.
The subjective quality scores of [27] are in MOS form 
ranging from 0 to 9, whereas difference MOS (DMOS) form 
is used in [36, 37] with ranges from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 100 
accordingly. For comparison, the original scores in these 
datasets are normalized to MOS from 0 to 1 in Table 1. The 
MOS scores predicted by the IQA model will be normalized 
to [0,1] also. 
TABLE I: IMPACT OF IMAGE QUALITY ON PERFORMANE OF 
WELLKNOWN DCNNS TRAINED ON IMAGENET
  Median Mean Std.
Subjective MOS 0.511 0.497 0.138
AlexNet 1.000 0.825 0.260
VGG-16 1.000 0.874 0.191
TID2013 
[27]
Wu-
Palmar 
Similarity ResNet-152 1.000 0.894 0.196
Subjective MOS 0.677 0.649 0.263
AlexNet 1.000 0.800 0.257
VGG-16 1.000 0.826 0.249
CSIQ [36] Wu-
Palmar 
Similarity ResNet-152 1.000 0.799 0.263
Subjective MOS 0.426 0.490 0.300
AlexNet 0.800 0.767 0.251
VGG-16 1.000 0.851 0.225
LIVE [37] Wu-
Palmar 
Similarity ResNet-152 1.000 0.835 0.238
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The visual signal in the image and video applications are 
subject to many kinds of distortions before presented to 
human or machine viewers. The distortions could be 
introduced during the signal acquisition, transforming, 
compression, transmitting, and restoring phases. Inarguably 
the poorer quality of input image, the less accurate object 
classification will be [19]. We are curious 1) whether there 
is a simple linear coloration between the image quality and 
DCNN performance in terms of accuracy, and 2) given 
images of similar quality, where there is a type of distortion 
impacting DCNN performance less. 
Analyzing the classification outputs from ResNet-152 on 
3000 distorted images from TID2013 by distortion types, 
several distinct patterns can be observed from Fig. 3. 
ResNet-152 is reasonably robust to images distorted by 
masked noise (MN), none eccentricity pattern noise 
(NEPN), the mean shift of intensity (MS), and a few more. 
Their kernel density estimation (KDE) plots indicate the 
semantic distance of these distorted images to corresponding 
reference image hold close to 0.9 while their visual quality 
varies from poor to OK quality, i.e., from 0.3 to 0.7 in 
predicted MOS. On the other hand, DCNN performance is 
highly sensitive to local block-wise distortion (BLOCK) and 
change of color saturation (CCS), as their KDEs stretch 
down to 0.3 along the semantic similarity axis while the 
image quality varies within a smaller range.
From Fig. 3, we can also make a qualitative observation 
that the positive correlation between CNN performance and 
input image quality is not linear, given that the performance 
degradation of DCNN responds differently to different types 
of distortions. Remember, these distorted images are 
generated from the same set of reference images.
C Adversarial Images
[19] shows hardly observable perturbation of image 
pixel values can cause CNN to produce a ridiculously wrong 
classification result. Several studies have been done to fool 
CNN. On the other side, methods defending CNN against 
such potential attacks are emerging. These two research 
directions are forging an arms race dynamic. Through 
observing the quality of the fooling images produced with 
the gradient ascent method in [20], an immediate intuition 
arises: could image quality be a useful feature to block CNN 
from being fooled or attacked?
 In [43], we lock down the weights of the ResNet-152 that 
is pre-trained on the ImageNet. We then apply transfer 
learning to build no-reference IQA models. Using the 
DTNIQ-f IQA model trained with the TID2013 dataset, we 
evaluate the quality of the unrecognizable and recognizable 
adversarial images, in predicted MOS. Two types of 
unrecognizable adversarial images are assessed. We collect 
5000 fooling images from [20] by the evolutionary 
algorithm and generate another 3000 fooling images using 
the gradient ascent method. For recognizable adversarial 
images, we apply the universal perturbation map of ResNet 
from [21] to perturb original images from the ImageNet 
validation set. Excluding gray images and failed to perturb, 
a total of 49,056 recognizable adversarial images are 
generated. Gray and too small images, e.g. 90 by 90 pixels, 
are ignored. A few such recognizable adversarial images are 
shown in the second row of Fig. 1 and appendix C.
TABLE II: QUALITY OF ORIGINAL IMAGENET VALIDATION 
SET AND ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES  
Predicted MOSNumber of 
Images
Adversarial 
Method Median Mean Std.
49056 None 0.429 0.454 0.106
49056 Universal Perturbation [21] 0.357 0.383 0.074
5000 Evolutionary Algorithm [20] 0.271 0.289 0.122
3000 Gradient Ascent Method [20] 0.271 0.271 0.018
Fig. 3. Left is a KDE of Wu-Palmar similarity of adversarial images generated with the universal perturbation map [21] versus quality predicted by the 
DTNIQ-f IQA model. Right is a grid of KDEs of TID2013 distorted images to their pristine images versus quality in normalized MOS term scored by human 
observers. The subplot legend is the abbreviation of distortion type. For example, AWN stands for additive Gaussian white noise, NEPN stands for none 
eccentricity pattern noise. See the full terms of the abbreviations in appendix B.
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significantly poor, as shown in Table II, statistically lower 
than the three image quality datasets, as shown in Table I. 
The average quality of perturbed images is statistically 
lower than their original versions as well. From the left 
column of Fig. 3, we see the semantic similarly of objects 
recognized from clean and perturbed images drops close to 
zero. 
To this end, we propose to take into consideration of 
image quality as a useful feature component in seeking 
methods that defense CNN from performance degradation 
and mitigate the probability of being fooled or attacked.
IV. PROPOSED METHODS
When visibility is low, a human driver will instinctively 
brake or slow down under normal circumstances. It is 
logical to extend this behavioral pattern to machine vision 
systems for their own safety and their human users. The 
experimental data and analyses around DCNN performance 
and input image quality lead us to a hypothesis that visual 
quality is a useful feature to be exploited for DCNN-based 
applications to detect potential input signal alterations that 
are not fit for recognition tasks, disregarding the intention 
behind the distortion of the images. 
In supervised learning, a DCNN-based vision model is 
trained and validated with a cohort of meaningful images. 
Given images utterly unrecognizable to human eyes, there is 
no value for a machine vision system to strive to recognize 
an object from it. From the statistics in Table II, a simple 
threshold-based baseline method can be constructed. For the 
fooling images generated from a mean map, the mean and 
standard deviation is 0.271 and 0.018 in predicted MOS 
respectively. If setting a quality threshold at 0.3 in predicted 
MOS, 94.6% fooling images can be discriminated, if the 
distribution of the visual quality scores is a perfectly normal 
distribution.
Applying this threshold on to the ResNet-152 model 
trained on the ImageNet, testing on the validation set shows 
that 2.44% images are below the threshold 0.3 and will be 
labeled as not fit for the object classification task, including 
tiny images of 90 by 90 pixels. A couple of such images are 
shown in Fig. 4.
 However, when the visual quality of input images is 
better than extremely poor or objects inside are recognizable 
to human eyes, say around 0.429 in predicted MOS, the fixed
Fig. 4. The left column is a t-SNE visualization of input features for the fit-
for-task detector. Middle and right columns are images from the ImageNet 
validation set. The predicted MOS values of both images are below 0.3.
threshold-based detection method will not work well. 
Because the statistics in Table II tells us that roughly 50% of 
the original images in the ImageNet validation set will be 
labeled as not fit.
Studying the statistics of prediction vectors produced by 
the ResNet-152, significant statistical differences can be 
observed between the original and adversarial images. The 
median value of the top-1 class confidence score of original 
images is as twice as high of corresponding adversarial 
images, whereas its standard deviation is smaller, see table 
III.
Distilling knowledge from the prediction vector is first 
proposed by [44], in which prediction probabilities from an 
ensemble of neural network models are distilled into a single 
model, and the performance of this single model is improved 
significantly. Our approach is to combine the quality score 
from the IQA model with the classification probability score 
from the ResNet-152, aiming to enhance detection power. 
The prediction probability vector from ResNet-152 is in 
1000 dimensions, but most are close to zero probability 
residual, thereby minimal knowledge to distill. We take the 
probability values of the top-5 predictions of an image 
together with its predicted quality score to form an input 
feature of six dimensions. Using the -t-SNE technique, we 
visualize these input features in the left column of Fig. 4. 
The gray dots represent features learned from the original 
images in the ImageNet validation ser. The red dots represent 
features learned from the fooling images produced by the 
evolutionary method in [20]. We can observe that most of 
the red dots are well separated from the gray dots, which 
infers it is hopeful to use SVM learning a useful detector. 
TABLE III: STATISTICS OF RESNET-152 PREDICTION VECTORS  
Top-1 Class Confidence Score
Category of Images
Median Mean Std.
Evolutionary Algorithm [20] 0.465 0.507 0.261
Universal Perturbation [21] 0.452 0.508 0.292
Original ImageNet Val. Set 0.929 0.800 0.244
The proposed method can easily be extended to object 
detection and localization segmentation tasks where the input 
features to the detector will be extracted from the candidate 
proposal regions instead of a whole image. 
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSES 
A Data
A set of experiments is designed to measure how 
effective the proposed approach will accept input images that 
ResNet-152 will correctly recognize objects in it and label 
images that will trigger ResNet-152 to make mistakes as 
unfit. Four categories of experiment data are collected or 
generated:
Original images: The top-1 and top-5 classification 
accuracy of the entire ImageNet validation set is 
75.92% and 92.83%, respectively, by the ResNet-152 
model we use. Only the original images that are 
7correctly classified per the top-1 prediction are 
selected, which leaves 37,962 original images in total.
• Distorted images: four types of distortion in five 
levels are applied to the above original images. The 
distortion types include Gaussian blur, white noise, 
and JPEG and JPEG2000 compression noise. A total 
of 759,240 distorted images are generated. Their 
quality ranges from 0.071 to 0.729 in predicted MOS.
• Recognizable adversarial images: 37,962 adversarial 
images are generated from the original images, using 
the universal perturbation map of ResNet-152 from 
[21]. The adversarial target of each sample is chosen 
randomly from the 999 classes, excluding the true 
object class. 
• Unrecognizable adversarial images: 3000 images are 
generated from a mean map using the ascent gradient 
method. We denote this group as Fool_GD. And 5000 
images are collected from [20] that are produced 
using the evolutionary algorithm. We denote this 
group as Fool_EV.
B Evaluation
We use ten DTNIQ-f NR-IQA models trained with the 
TID2013 image quality dataset to predict MOS scores of 
distorted and adversarial images. For distorted images, one 
model is selected randomly from the ten DTNIQ-f NR-IQA 
models to produce MOS scores, i.e., the ten detectors are 
trained with a single set of features. Performances are 
reported in an average of the ten detectors. For recognizable 
distorted and adversarial images, a baseline of object 
recognition results from ResNet-152 is established first. The 
detection rate and the recognition accuracy of images labeled 
as fit by the detector are compared with the corresponding 
baseline. 
All experiments and data generation are carried out on a 
computer equipped with a GeForce GTX 1080 Ti and using 
the Caffe platform, with exception to recognizable 
adversarial images that are generated on the TensorFlow 
platform. 
C Baselines
Not all attacks are successful, and not all distortions lead 
to incorrect object recognition outcomes. We define object 
recognition accuracy of ResNet-152 without quality 
awareness as baseline-1 and that with the threshold-based 
quality filtering as baseline-2. Table IV summarizes the test
TABLE IV: SUMMARY OF BASELINES
results. In baseline-1, we see the accuracy of ResNet-152 on 
adversarial and distorted image groups drops from 100% to 
just above 50%. Note the corresponding original images that 
are used to produce these images are all correctly classified 
by ResNet-152. 
In baseline-2, 96.7% Fool_GD and 54.11% Fool_EV 
images are detected. Since these are fooling images, there is 
no point to reporting ResNet-152’s accuracy. 48.16% of 
distorted images are detected, which leads to the accuracy of 
ResNet-152 over fit images increases to 73.04%.
Baseline-2 detects only 4.21% of the recognizable 
adversarial images. If increasing the quality threshold from 
predicted MOS 0.3 to 0.35, 47.25% of them can be detected. 
However, the accuracy of ResNet-152 over fit images doesn't 
increase; instead, it drops from 73.04% to 72.45%. This 
indicates that the discriminative power of quality feature 
alone is weak over the recognizable adversarial images.
D Performance
Next, we show that by distilling object classification 
information from ResNet-152, the detection power increases 
significantly. With input features generated from four groups 
of images, many different training schemas are possible. 
However, our primary goal of this experiment is to improve 
the detection capacity over the recognizable adversarial 
images. After some trials, we decide to take only the 
recognizable adversarial images and their corresponding 
original images to learn a binary detection classifier. 50% of 
recognizable adversarial images and their corresponding 
original images are selected randomly to form a training set, 
which ensures an adversarial and its original image appear 
together in either the train or test set. Rest 50% is held out 
for testing. This sampling method is repeated ten times to 
train ten detection classifiers. To test the detection 
performance on distorted images, only distorted images that 
their corresponding original images are not in a training set 
are selected. 
Table V summarizes the test results. We can see 65.95% 
of recognizable adversarial images are detected, and the 
accuracy of ResNet-152 over fit images increases to 85.22%. 
The result indicates that, indeed, there is useful information 
residing in the prediction probability vector of the object 
recognition classifier. The detector can effectively protect 
ResNet-152 and alike-based applications from potential 
attacks that exploit the universal map adversarial method. 
Can the detector generalized well to quality degradation 
produced with other methods? The detector is not trained 
with any sample from the fool image groups and distorted 
TABLE V:  PERFORMANCE OF DETECTOR
Image Group DetectionRate
ResNet-152 
Accuracy
Adversarial 65.95% 85.22%
Distorted 65.81% 92.36%
Fool_EV 78.29% -
Fool_GD 99.64%
Fit
Images
  
-
Baseline-1 Baseline-2
Image 
Group  ResNet-152 
Accuracy
Detection 
Rate
 ResNet-152 
Accuracy
Adversarial 55.42% 4.21% 54.69%
Distorted 57.04% 48.16% 73.04%
Fool_EV - 54.11% -
Fool_GD - 96.70%
Fit     
Images

-
8image group. The patterns of artifacts injected into the 
distorted images are different from the universal perturbation 
map. Nevertheless, the experiment result indicates that the 
detector can generalize what learned from the latter pattern 
to discriminate common distortion patterns such as white 
noise and JPEG compression error. As we can see, the 
accuracy of ResNet-152 over fit images increases to 92.36%, 
from 73.04% in baseline-2. For the Fool_EV group, the 
detection rate increases to 78.29%, from 54.11% in baseline-
2. And only 0.06% of images from the Fool_FD group is 
missed out by the detector. 
Will the detector trigger a high false alarm rate over images 
that would be correctly classified by ResNet-152? Tests with 
the original image group show that the detector labels 
91.43% of them as fit. Image examples that the detector 
succeeds or fails to detect are shown in appendix C.
E Comparison and Discussion
The defense against adversarial work in the literature 
looks into adversarial examples only. Therefore, most of 
these works validate their methods against adversarial 
examples but don't test the false alarm rate over clean 
images. For example, the cascade SVM in [30] achieves 
overall 97.34% detection accuracy over the Fool_EV 
images; however, the potential misclassification rate is not 
investigated. Using 1000 MNIST samples and 100 random 
samples from the ImageNet, [34] concludes the cascade 
SVM produces a 92% false positive rate. 
Most of these works use images from the MNIST and 
CIFAIR-10 to validate their defense methods. If images 
from the ImageNet are involved, only a small portion is 
selected. For example, [33] tests 5000 images from ten 
object classes in the ImageNet that are relevant per CIFAIR-
10. [34] validates 1489 ImageNet images belong to three 
object classes (zebra, panda, and cab), why selecting these 
particular three object classes is not explained. 
We validate proposed methods over 805,202 adversarial 
or distorted images, and 37,962 original images from the 
ImageNet validation set, covering 1000 object classes in the 
ImageNet. It is hard to run a direct performance comparison 
with other defense methods at this massive scale. Besides 
adversarial images yet perceivable to human eyes per IQA 
standard, we are interested in detecting poor quality images 
too. Alternatively, we construct two baselines and compare 
the performance of the proposed method with the baselines. 
And show our detector can well protect the object 
classification CNN from making wrong predictions when 
input images are of poor quality or maliciously altered with 
the three attacking methods tested.
Examining the unrecognizable adversarial images, we can 
observe these images do not have a meaningful composition 
from photography standard or distinctly different 
composition compared to natural images. The composition 
of an image impacts the visual distinctness of objects in an 
image, including the space and size of the foreground 
object, the complexity of background texture, contrast, and 
many more. 
Analyzing the classification results of reference and 
distorted images in the image quality datasets, we notice a 
couple of images stand out, see columns 1 and 2 in Fig. 5. 
ResNet-152 classifies all distorted images of each as the 
same object class as its reference image. At this time, we 
don't see a simple way to exploit it, but it could be a 
potential direction to look into in the future.
Fig. 5. Columns 1 and 2 are reference images that Wu-Palmar similarity of 
all their distorted images equals 1. Column 3 is a sample of jpeg distortion 
of normalized MOS 0.451 and column 4 is a sample of additive pink 
Gaussian distortion of normalized MOS 0.449.
VI CONCLUSION
Although poor quality images are not malicious, they 
could drag the object classification performance down and 
pose potential harm the same way as adversarial images. In 
this paper, we identify the value from the traditional IQA 
field in tackling one emerging challenge to the rising deep 
CNN technologies. Experimentally we show that there is an 
intrinsic connection between the adversarial pixel 
perturbations and visual quality per the human visual 
system. We introduce the fit-for-task notation and propose 
non-intrusive methods to prevent the production of object 
classification results when the inputs are far below optimal, 
thereby increasing the robustness of CNN-based vision 
systems in the real-world environment. Visual quality 
manipulation is relatively cheap to implement, but it could 
also bring down the performance of a CNN network. We 
conclude that the proposed methods could serve well as a 
first-line security mechanism for CNN-based vision 
applications. 
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APPENDIX A –SEMANTIC SIMILARITY BETWEEN OBJECTS  
 Examples of objects recognized from reference and distorted images by the ResNet-152 model trained on the ImageNet and 
Wu-Palmar similarity between objects, which is range from 0 to 1. Each object is represented by a synset in the WordNet [46]. 
The Wu-Palmar similarity between warplane and airliner is 0.88, and 0.50 between catamaran and safety pin. The images are 
from the LIVE  [37] and TID2013 [27] datasets. 
Pristine quality
Warplane
1.0
Gaussian blur
Airliner
0.88
White noise
Stingray
0.32
Fast fading
Bubble
0.11
Pristine quality
Catamaran
1.0
LCNI*
Trimanan
0.88
JP2K*
Sea boat
0.77
JP2K*
Ski
0.55
JP2K*
Safety pin
0.50
* See appendix B for full term of distortion type.
APPENDIX B - FULL TERM OF DISTORTION TYPES IN FIG. 3
Abbreviation Distortion Type Abbreviation Distortion Type
AWN Additive Gaussian white noise JP2K JPEG2000 compression
SCN Spatially correlated noise JGTE JPEG transmission errors
MH Masked noise J2TE JPEG2000 transmission errors
HFN High frequency noise NEPN Non eccentricity pattern noise
IMN Impulse noise MS Mean shift (intensity shift)
QN Quantization noise CTC Contrast change
GB Gaussian blur CCS Change of color saturation
DEN Image denoising MGN Multiplicative Gaussian noise
JPEG JPEG compression CN Comfort noise
LCNI Lossy compression of noisy imagesANMC Additive noise in color components 
(more intensive than additive noise in 
the luminance component)
BLOCK Local block-wise distortions of 
different intensity
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APPENDIX C – DETECTION OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Adversarial examples in rows 1 and 2 are successfully detected otherwise would be wrongly classified by ResNet-152. In row 
3, the left two adversarial examples are falsely labeled as unfit by the detector, although ResNet-152 would correctly classify 
them; the right two adversarial examples are not detected and successfully fool ResNet-152. The actual object labels of the 3rd 
and 4th images are goldfish and banana. But ResNet-152 classifies them as brain coral and pineapple. All fooling images in 
row 4 are detected successfully.
Detected
MOS 0.700
Detected
MOS 0.614
Detected
MOS 0.600
Detected
MOS 0.586
Detected 
MOS 0.486
Detected 
MOS 0.471
Detected 
MOS 0.457
Detected
MOS 0.414
False alarm 
MOS 0.271
False alarm 
MOS 0.129
Missed out 
MOS 0.686
Missed out 
MOS 0.286
Detected
MOS 0.271
Detected 
MOS 0.271
Detected
MOS 0.271
Detected 
MOS 0.229
